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THE CURRENCY CRUNCH AND MILITARISATION 
S-E Asia still groping ahead 
By DEEPA M OLLAPALLY IN just a few short months, the aura surrounding the South-East Asian "miracle" seems to 
have dissipated dramatically 
thanks to the currency crisis be-
ing experienced by Thailand, Mal-
aysia, South Korea and Indonesia. 
UntD the currency crunch, South-
East Asia's economic success sto-
ry which occurred over a period 
of two decades, seemed destined to 
be translated into a military suc-
cess story as well, with significant 
implications for the broader 
Asian balance of power. Given the 
current economic ills, a closer 
look at the military prospects of 
the region and its relationship to 
the economy seems to be 
warranted. 
Critical exception 
Since the end of the cold war in 
1991, global defence expenditures 
have been on the decline, with the 
critical exception of Asia, most no-
tably South-East Asia. The arms 
imports to the Asian region are 
rising faster than anywhere else 
in the world (overtaking the 
Middle East), and is one of the key 
markets for advanced weapons 
systems. South-East Asia alone 
represents nearly a quarter of the 
market for world sales of weapons 
and is the third largest weapons 
market, only after the US and Eur-
ope. 
The weapons being imported 
into South-East Asia are increas-
ing in sophistication, driven in 
part by US-Russian competition. 
The decision by the US last year 
to reverse its earlier stand and sell 
the Advanced Medium Range Air 
to Air Missile (AMRAAM) to Thai-
land is a case in point. The US re-
versal came in the wake of Thai 
officials linking the sale of 
AMRAAMs to Thailand's pur-
chase of American F-18 fighter jets 
and broad hints that Russian MiG-
&te could be considered instead. 
Sagging demand and surplus de-
fence industry capacity in the US 
and Russia are propelling the for-
mer foes from a nuclear race to a 
conventional arms sales race fo-
cused primarily in South-East 
Asia. 
The unforseen financial turmoil 
is clearly changing the defence 
spending habits of the recent past 
of important countries in South-
East Asia. Indeed, with the Thai 
bhat at 40 per cent of what its 
value was in relation to the dollar 
in mid-1997, the Indonesian rupiah 
and the Malaysian ringgit having 
been devalued by 35 per cent and 
38 per cent during the second half 
of 1997 and the South Korean cur-
rency dropping by 25 per cent, 
drastic cuts in the defence budgets 
were inevitable. One of the worst 
hit, Thailand's defence budget is 
likely to dip to nearly 30 per cent 
of its planned level; the situation 
is similar elsewhere in the region. 
While policymakers in the re-
gion see cuts in defence outlays as 
necessary to survive the ongoing 
crisis, it appears unlikely to have 
a long-term impact on their mili-
tary plans for a number of rea-
sons, both economic and political. 
Economically speaking, many ana-
lysts seem to agree that the worst 
effects of the crisis could be miti-
gated in the next two years. No 
one is suggesting that these econ-
omies are "going under." 
Bail-out funds 
Even in the case of South Korea, 
which is receiving the greatest 
amount of bail-out funds from the 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and others, the consensus is 
that it is a crisis much more of 
the financial sector than of the 
real economy. 
Moreover, the relatively quick 
reaction time of the international 
community to arrange rescue 
packages also attests to the critical 
importance attached to the econ-
omies in this part of the world. 
(This stands in contrast to the 
Latin American debt crisis In the 
early 1980s when the debt restruc-
turing agreements tended to be 
tentative and ad hoc). After a 
short initial period of demurring, 
the IMF, the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, Japan 
and the United States, have been 
active in providing relief for 
Indonesia, Thailand and South 
Korea. These assistance packages 
have ranged from $17.5 billion for 
Thailand to $57.5 billion for South 
Korea. Malaysia has so far resisted 
approaching the Fund. 
Security demands 
Although the region (except 
South Korea) is relatively free of 
immediate security demands, it 
cannot be assumed that military 
procurement plans will be entirely 
shelved or forgotten due to the 
economic crisis. Most of the coun-
tries of the region are spending on 
force modernisation and 
upgrading. 
They are also attempting to gain 
some of the capabilities once pro-
vided by outside powers, especial-
ly the US, whose commitment can-
not be counted upon in the post 
Cold War period. 
A major concern which is not 
likely to disappear, is with the 
growing Chinese military capabil-
ity in the long term. Since 1985, 
China has been engaged in a 
weapons modernisation pro-
gramme, with particular emphasis 
on improving its technological 
sophistication in the wake of the 
lessons from the Gulf War and the 
critical role of high technology 
weaponry. 
There are already some signs 
that the hard-hit countries are 
willing to experiment with innova-
tive means to ride out the crisis 
and save some projects. For 
example, military officials are 
raising the possibility of pooling 
their procurement funds across 
countries and sharing of training 
assets. With the South-East Asian 
countries facing relatively similar 
requirements, co-operative pur-
chases of standard ammunition 
and upgrade of fighter planes 
could be made in the future, es-
pecially between Thailand, 
Malayasia and Indonesia. 
In Malaysia, while defence pur-
chases are being slowed, industry 
representatives have suggested 
that if the Government cancels or 
defers any big ticket civil 
infrastructural projects, more 
money may become available for 
smaller defence projects. 
Flush with the success of their 
economies, South-East Asian 
countries had been poised to con-
solidate their politico-military 
status with their economic status. 
Thus many defence programmes 
may be driven more by concern 
about prestige than about national 
security per se and may be ex-
pected to survive. 
Formidable force 
Historically speaking, such a 
trend is hardly surprising or new. 
Such sentiment is also unlikely to 
give way easily. Despite the 
cutbacks by its neighbours, Singa-
pore, for example, has gone ahead 
with its planned purchase of 12 US 
built F-16s at a cost of $350 million, 
which would make the city state's 
fleet the most formidable front 
line fighter force in the region. 
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